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MANAGING “RETREAT”: THE CHALLENGES OF ADAPTING LAND 
USE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
Andrea McArdle
*
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Coastal cities of all sizes and levels of development face mounting 
governance challenges1 in response to climate science’s projections2 of 
continued ocean warming and sea-level rise.3 These challenges implicate a 
burgeoning set of responsibilities for protecting public health and safety, 
including food security, environmental quality, biodiversity, effective 
stewardship over the integrity of the built environment and infrastructure, 
and maintaining local economic well-being. Addressing these 
 
*
 Andrea McArdle is Professor of Law at City University of New York School of Law, holds 
law degrees and a Ph.D. in American Studies, and teaches and writes on urban land use 
through an equity lens, including the environmental and socioeconomic challenges faced by 
urban communities confronted with climate risk, and urban policy makers’ approach to 
resilience strategies. 
 1. At the 2015 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, UN Member States 
recognized the role of local governments as stakeholders for participating in strategies to 
reduce the risk of natural and human-made disaster. Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction 2015–2030, U.N. OFF. FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION (2015), http://www.unisdr 
.org/we/inform /publications/43291. 
 2. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s 2014 Synthesis Report, based on 
the reports of the Panel’s three Working Groups, including relevant Special Reports, as the 
final part of the Panel’s Fifth Assessment Report, underscores the risks in its Summary for 
Policymakers. 
SPM 2.3 Future risks and impacts caused by a changing climate: 
Climate change will amplify existing risks and create new risks for 
natural and human systems. Risks are unevenly distributed and are 
generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities in countries 
at all levels of development. 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS 
REPORT 13 (The Core Writing Team, Rajendra K. Pachauri & Leo Meyer eds., 2014), 
http://ar5-syr.ipcc.ch/ipcc/ipcc/resources/pdf/IPCC_SynthesisReport.pdf [hereinafter SPM 
2.3]. 
 3. In one of the more urgent predictions concerning sea-level rise, the melting of ice on 
Antarctica alone could cause seas to rise more than 15 meters (49 feet) by 2500 if ongoing 
levels of greenhouse gas emissions persist. Brady Dennis & Chris Mooney, Scientists Nearly 
Double Sea Level Rise Projections for 2100, Because of Antarctica, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/03/30/antarctic-
loss-could-double-expected-sea-level-rise-by-2100-scientists-say/?utm_term=.044481386d88 
(discussing Robert M. DeConto & David Pollard, Contribution of Antarctica to Past and 
Future Sea-Level Rise, 531 NATURE INT’L. J. OF SCI. 591 (2016)). 
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responsibilities, in turn, implicates cities’ legal authority, political 
capacity—including the capacity and will to build acceptance of local 
governance responses—and ability to leverage funding for weather disaster 
reduction. This article adopts as a working definition of climate governance 
the range of policy-setting mechanisms by which cities engage these 
challenges and responsibilities, including legislation, executive action, 
participating in litigation, and involvement in multisectoral and transnational 
networks. 
In the face of elevated urban climate risks, the concept of resilience has 
gained considerable ground as both a governance response and an 
increasingly pervasive discourse. With its definitional and conceptual 
breadth, resilience offers cities a range of tools for adapting to climate-
related risks. To date, most cities have emphasized coastal and building-and-
infrastructural resilience as climate governance strategies. They have not 
embraced land-use alternatives, collectively referred to as “managed 
retreat,” that discourage, limit, or seek to reverse development of areas that 
are vulnerable to coastal inundation, and that opt for natural reuses of land, 
based on the costs and risks associated with rebuilding. Given the 
projections of increased and new risks posed by climate change,4 this article 
considers the role that managed retreat might have in climate governance 
policies. 
Recognizing the potentially substantial costs and practical barriers to 
implementing many aspects of managed retreat, especially in densely 
populated urban floodplains, the article argues that retreat options 
nonetheless should be included in the calculus of adaptive strategies that 
coastal cities consider. Public health, safety, environmental, equity, and 
economic concerns make retreat a highly salient consideration for any 
locality’s climate governance policy. The extent to which it is feasible for a 
locality to apply managed retreat strategies, even in part, as a component of 
climate resilience will depend on the local context, economy, population, 
built environment, and infrastructure, including the extent to which retreat 
would entail, on the one hand, curtailing development on currently 
undeveloped, vulnerable areas or, on the other, condemning or buying out 
presently occupied properties. 
To develop this analysis, Part II identifies key attributes of the 
discourse and practice of climate resilience, noting three central modalities 
of resilient climate governance: coastal resilience, resilient rebuilding, and 
managed retreat. Part III considers the approaches taken to climate 
governance by three coastal cities with recognized vulnerability to coastal 
inundation as suggestive of a general preference for coastal and structural- 
and infrastructural-resilience strategies over managed retreat. 
 
 4. SPM 2.3, supra note 2. 
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Part IV addresses cities’ contrastingly infrequent resort to managed 
retreat and considers in greater depth the implications of using managed 
retreat as a climate governance response. This section examines data 
detailing characteristics of housing and the demographic make-up of 
residents of the U.S. coastal areas that would be directly affected by 
implementing a retreat policy. Further, it considers factors that complicate 
the adoption of retreat as a strategy, including an ideology of urban growth 
and economic, logistical, and other practical obstacles to pursuing retreat as 
a form of climate governance. 
Drawing on the analysis in Part IV, Part V considers New York’s 
limited application of retreat principles following the effects of Superstorm 
Sandy, a destructive and costly tropical cyclone that struck the northeastern 
U.S. in 2012.5 Examining New York’s experience in light of the factors that 
favor rebuilding and militate against an easy embrace of managed retreat, 
this section raises concern about the city’s ongoing up-zoning and planned 
development in floodplain areas. The article concludes with an inventory of 
considerations relevant to potential use of managed retreat by localities at 
any scale as part of the calculus for developing sound, responsible, and 
environmentally equitable climate governance responses. 
II. CLIMATE GOVERNANCE: MODALITIES OF CLIMATE RESILIENCE 
A. Resilience as a Governance Discourse 
The definitional and conceptual breadth of resilience has enabled it to 
operate across disciplines and discursive traditions as a “boundary object”6 
and ”pervasive idiom.”7 It appears in the literature of a range of disciplines, 
including engineering, psychology, ecology, social systems, and disaster 
recovery.8 In an urban planning context, ideas associated with resilience 
have contributed to a comprehensive definition focusing on urban resilience 
as a methodology: 
 
 5. The National Hurricane Center of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration ranks Sandy as the fourth costliest mainland U.S. tropical cyclone. Costliest 
U.S. Tropical Cyclones Tables Updated, NAT’L HURRICANE CTR. (Jan. 26, 2018), 
https://www. nhc.noaa.gov/news/UpdatedCostliest.pdf. 
 6. Sara Meerow, Joshua P. Newell & Melissa Stults, Defining Urban Resilience: A 
Review, 147 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 38, at 39, 46; Kathleen Tierney, Resilience and the 
Neoliberal Project: Discourses, Critiques, Practices—And Katrina, 59 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 1, at 
5–6 (2015), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1024.3276&rep=rep1 
&type=pdf. 
 7. Tierney, supra note 6, at 5. 
 8. Patrick Martin-Breen & J. Marty Anderies, Resilience: A Literature Review, 
BELLAGIO INITIATIVE (2011), https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/123456789/3692. 
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[T]he ability of an urban system—and all of its constituent socio-
ecological and socio-technical networks across temporal and spatial 
scales—to maintain or rapidly return to desired functions in the face of a 
disturbance, to adapt to change, and to quickly transform systems that 
limit current or future adaptive capacity.
9
 
In the broader disaster-response literature, resilience has also been 
conceptualized as a process, in the sense of learning and improving 
decision-making to better respond to risks.10 
The conceptual underpinnings of resilience have been central to the 
policy and technocratic discussions in the burgeoning field of climate 
governance. In the climate context, the Rockefeller Foundation has 
supported a range of initiatives to increase the capacity of localities to adapt 
to coastal risks.11 Reflecting that orientation toward efficacious response to 
climate disturbance, the Foundation defines resilience as the “capacity of an 
individual, community, or institution to dynamically and effectively respond 
to shifting climate impact circumstances while continuing to function at an 
acceptable level.” 12 
Attributes associated with resilient city governance include systems 
that are reflective, robust, redundant, flexible, resourceful, inclusive, and 
integrated.13 Although, as a managerial practice, resilience can operate non-
ideologically, the breadth and flexibility of resilience as a concept also have 
rhetorical and political dimensions. The orientation of resilience toward 
positive functioning and outcomes has led to a tendency in climate 
governance discourse to lapse into colloquial and political usage of the term 
 
 9. Meerow et al., supra note 6, at 45. 
 10. Susan Cutter et al., A Place-based Model for Understanding Community Resilience 
to Natural Disasters, 18 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 598, 600 (2008). 
 11. See, e.g., 100 RESILIENT CITIES, http://www.100resilientcities.org/about-us/ (last 
visited Aug. 31, 2018) (providing financial, logistical, and expert support for a network of 
selected cities to pursue resilience strategies that will address “not just the shocks—
earthquakes, fires, floods, etc.—but also the stresses that weaken the fabric of a city on a day 
to day or cyclical basis”); Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network, ROCKEFELLER 
FOUNDATION, https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/our-work/initiatives/asian-cities-climate 
-change-resilience-network/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2018) (capacity building to assist cities in 
six Asian countries develop climate resilience strategies). 
 12. ROCKEFELLER FOUND., Building Climate Change Resilience 1 (Aug. 4, 2009), 
https://www.acccrn.net/sites/default/files/publication/attach/10_RF_WhitePaper_Resilience.p
df. 
 13. Brett Branco & John R. Waldman, Resilience Practice in Urban Watersheds, in 
PROSPECTS FOR RESILIENCE: INSIGHTS FROM NEW YORK CITY’S JAMAICA BAY 21, 28 (Eric W. 
Sanderson et al., eds., 2016) (discussing urban resilience formulation developed by ARUP, an 
independent group of designers, planners, and engineers, “working across every aspect of 
today’s built environment”). 
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and to conflate it with more precise disciplinary meanings,14 a practice 
evident in New York City’s use of resilience as a signifier for “toughness.”15 
Some commentators have noted that resilience narratives can fit comfortably 
within neoliberal political and economic arrangements, emphasizing growth 
and privatization or public-private partnerships.16 In this view, resilience as a 
governance strategy contemplates a strong role for the private development 
sector in post-disaster campaigns.17 
B. Strategies of Climate Resilience 
In the context of urban climate governance, the principal resilient 
strategies comprise coastal protection, including hard18 and soft19 armoring; 
rebuilding structures to revised standards thought to withstand predicted 
effects of climate change; and managed retreat, that is, various land- use 
controls and legal mechanisms that limit or adapt development of coastal 
land in light of its vulnerability to sea-level rise and storm surges.20 Retreat 
options encompass a range of land-use adaptations, including limits on 
rebuilding, acquiring coastal land to prevent further development, resettling 
residential populations further inland away from flood-prone areas, 
 
 14. Fiona Miller et al., Resilience and Vulnerability: Complementary or Conflicting 
Concepts?, 15 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 3 (2010), http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss3 
/art11/. 
 15. PLANYC, A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK 6 (2013), http://s-media.nyc. 
gov/agencies/sirr/SIRR_singles_Lo_res.pdf [hereinafter A Stronger, More Resilient New 
York]. 
 16. Tierney, supra note 6, at 6–9. 
 17. Id. at 11–13. 
 18. Hard armoring generally is the use of physical structures such as seawalls, 
breakwaters, and riprap to hold back the flow of sea water and prevent erosion of shoreline 
sediment. What is shoreline armoring? NAT’L OCEAN SERV., https://oceanservice.noaa.gov 
/facts/ shoreline-armoring.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2018). See also Megan M. Herzog & 
Sean B. Hecht, Combatting Sea-Level Rise in Southern California: How Local Governments 
Can Seize Adaptation Opportunities While Minimizing Legal Risk, 19 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 463, 492–97 (2013) (discussing methods of hard and soft shoreline 
armoring). 
 19. Soft armoring refers to nature-based buffering against flooding, such as restoring 
coastal wetlands or creating living shorelines. Executive Summary of Soft Armoring and the 
Corps: The Impact of Army Corps of Engineers Permitting On State Coastal Protection 
Policies, GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CTR. (Dec. 2011), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/GCC_ACOEpermittingES_12-11_Finalv2.pdf. Living shorelines 
are stabilization methods that establish or preserve species habitats and ecosystem benefits. 
Living Shorelines, VA. INST. MARINE SCI., CTR. FOR COASTAL RESOURCES MGMT., 
http://www.vims.edu/ccrm/outreach/living_shorelines/index.php (last visited Oct 13, 2018). 
 20. See generally ANNE SIDERS, MANAGED COASTAL RETREAT: A LEGAL HANDBOOK ON 
SHIFTING DEVELOPMENT AWAY FROM VULNERABLE AREAS, COLUM. LAW SCH. CTR. FOR 
CLIMATE CHANGE (Oct. 2013), https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/ 
climate-change/files/Publications/Fellows/ManagedCoastalRetreat_FINAL_Oct%2030.pdf. 
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discontinuing at-risk business and institutional uses, and developing nature-
based reuses of coastal land, such as wetlands restoration and cultivating 
parkland, that can serve as natural buffers to the effects of storm surges.21 
This suite of resilience strategies varies along a number of axes, such 
as whether they entail rebuilding or restrictions on development, whether 
they employ nature-based or human-made shoreline protections, and 
whether limitations on development apply prospectively or restrict 
continued use or redevelopment of currently occupied properties, which 
includes the possibility of relocating residents or businesses. Coastal cities 
choose climate governance approaches that reflect local geography, political 
economy, ideology, and political will, and thus the potential for variation is 
considerable, even among localities that are the most vulnerable to coastal 
inundation. Part III considers the approaches taken to climate governance by 
three coastal cities as suggestive of a general preference for structural- and 
infrastructural-resilience strategies within an overall orientation toward 
redeveloping and protecting the waterfront. 
III. CLIMATE RESILIENCE STRATEGIES APPLIED: THREE FLOOD-
VULNERABLE CITIES 
The climate governance choices of flood-vulnerable cities necessarily 
will reflect local context, history, geography, ecology, economy, and 
cultural orientation toward risk, against the backdrop of requirements or 
guidelines included in state coastal development programs under the 
auspices of the federal Coastal Zone Management Act.22 Nonetheless, the 
adaptive approaches taken by the three illustrative cities discussed in this 
section—New Orleans, New York, and Rotterdam in the Netherlands—
suggest shared preferences for hard armored protections of the waterfront 
and rebuilding waterfront structures over managed retreat options. 
A. New Orleans: Rebuilding and Protecting Against Coastal Inundation 
In August 2005, the ravages of Hurricane Katrina, ranked by the 
National Hurricane Center as the costliest tropical storm at $125 billion in 
damages,23 breached levees that inundated large portions of New Orleans’ 
low-lying land and led to the evacuation of more than one-half of the city’s 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq.; Act of Oct. 27, 
1972, 86 Stat. 1280 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq.) (1972); See generally 
SIDERS, supra note 20, at 21–35. 
 23. Hurricane Katrina is statistically tied with Hurricane Harvey as the costliest tropical 
storm in terms of total monetary damage. NAT’L HURRICANE CTR., supra note 5. 
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residents.24 In the storm’s aftermath, a policy storm raged within the city 
regarding whether the most vulnerable parts of the city should be rebuilt at 
all.25 The ambivalent acceptance of the idea that New Orleans residents had 
the “right to return” to New Orleans26 resolved the policy debate in favor of 
rebuilding and fortifying the city to withstand at least a 100-year storm.27 As 
a consequence, the city’s post-Katrina expenditures, mainly provided by 
federal or state funds, were dedicated to housing programs—with their own 
checkered history28—and the construction of an elaborate system of levees, 
walls, and pumps.29 
Federally financed through Community Development Block Grant-
Disaster Recovery funds and administered by state government, the 
Louisiana Road Home program distributed $9 billion in grants to support 
rebuilding more than 70% of housing units damaged by Hurricane Katrina.30 
Using three tiers of cash grants as incentives, the program promoted 
rebuilding in heavily inundated neighborhoods.31 
 
 24. Allison Plyer, Facts for Features: Katrina Impact, DATA CTR. (Aug. 26, 2016), 
https://www.datacenterresearch.org/data-resources/katrina/facts-for-impact/. 
 25. See, e.g., Darryl Lorenzo Wellington, New Orleans: A Right to Return? 53 DISSENT 
23, 32–34; Ray Taras, After the Storm: Pathologies of Decision Making in New Orleans, 
POL’Y OPTIONS (Dec. 1, 2005), http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/global-warming-a-
perfect-storm/after-the-storm-pathologies-of-decision-making-in-new-orleans/. 
 26. See, e.g., Lolita B. Inniss, A Domestic Right of Return?: Race, Rights, and Residency 
in New Orleans in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 325 
(2007), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/twlj/vol27/iss2/2 (noting the financial, logistical, 
and programmatic impediments placed in the way of black New Orleans residents’ return to 
their homes after Katrina). 
 27. See Amy Liu, BUILDING A BETTER NEW ORLEANS: A REVIEW OF AND PLAN FOR 
PROGRESS ONE YEAR AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA, BROOKINGS INST. (2006), https://www. 
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/200608_katrinareview.pdf. 
 28. Kevin Fox Gotham, Reinforcing Inequalities: The Impact of the CDBG Program on 
Post-Katrina Rebuilding, 24:1 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 192, 199–205 (2014), http://dx. 
doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2013.840666. 
 29. John Schwartz, How to Save a Sinking Coast? Katrina Created a Laboratory, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/08/science/louisiana-10-years-
after-hurricane-katrina.html. 
 30. JESSE GREGORY, THE IMPACT OF POST-KATRINA REBUILDING GRANTS ON THE 
RESETTLEMENT CHOICES OF NEW ORLEANS HOMEOWNERS 5–6 (June 2017) (unpublished 
working paper), https://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~jmgregory/Gregory_katrina_dissertation2.pdf. 
 31. Although the grant amounts were capped, higher awards were given to residents who 
pledged either to rebuild a damaged home or build a new home in Louisiana within the three-
year window provided by the program according to the following guidelines: 
(1) Grant to residential property owners to rebuild within three years; 
grant limited to difference between amount of damages and insurance 
proceeds received (up to $150,000); 
(2) Grant in the same amount to finance building a new home within 
three years in Louisiana in exchange for turning over the current 
612 UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
Supplementing the program for homeowners, and reflecting the large 
number of rental properties that were damaged, the Small Rental Property 
Program paid 4,500 landlords $435 million to build affordable units for low- 
to moderate-income families.32 The program led to the demolition of four 
public housing projects, which were replaced with mixed-income housing 
and a voucher system.33 
The rebuilding programs were open to the criticism that they 
essentially placed returning New Orleans residents in low-lying 
neighborhoods in the direct path of future severe flooding. However, $14.5 
billion was expended to construct 350 miles of levees, pumps, and gates 
around the city to withstand a 100-year storm.34 Further, state-led efforts 
under the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority35 were launched as 
part of a master planning process that included restoring wetlands and 
building up barrier islands in part with “diversions” of silt and freshwater to 
nourish and raise up land.36 
 
property to the Louisiana Land Trust, which gave the properties to local 
redevelopment agencies; 
(3) Similar to (2) but 40% smaller grant to reflect absence of rebuilding 
or location requirements. 
Id. 
 32. David Hammer, Examining Post-Katrina Road Home Program: ‘It’s more than the 
money. It’s the hoops we had to jump through to do it,’ THE ADVOCATE (Aug. 23, 2015, 4:51 
AM), http://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_f9763ca5-42ba-5a62-9935-
c5f7ca94a7c4.html. 
 33. For discussion of a report on the policy and its impact, see Dani McClain, Former 
Residents of New Orleans’s Demolished Housing Projects Tell Their Stories, THE NATION 
(Aug. 28, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/former-residents-of-new-orleans-
demolished-housing-projects-tell-their-stories/. 
 34. Miguel Llanos, Will New Orleans’ $14.5 Billion Walls Stand Up to the Next Big 
Storm?, NBC NEWS (Aug. 26 2015, 8:37 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ 
hurricane-katrina-anniversary/new-orleans-14-5-billion-walls-n415816. 
 35. The Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority’s 2017 Master Plan, projecting 
$50 billion in coastal projects, includes the largest national investment in marsh creation from 
dredged material and sediment diversion, which are expected to build up land that has been 
disappearing along the coast as a result of erosion and subsidence, exacerbated by oil drilling 
and other economic activities, and sea-level rise. Kevin Sack & John Schwartz, Left to 
Louisiana’s Tides, A Village Fights for Time, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes 
.com/interactive/2018/02/24/us/100000005761606.app.html?emc=edit_ta_20180224&nl=top
-stories&nlid=27366739&ref=cta. 
 36. “The 2017 Coastal Master Plan includes 79 restoration, 13 structural protection, and 
32 nonstructural risk reduction projects. . . .” The plan defines restoration projects as those 
that “build or maintain land and support productive habitat for commercially and 
recreationally important activities coast wide.” Structural protection projects serve as 
physical barriers against storm surge. Nonstructural risk reduction projects comprise other 
resilience strategies, such as raising and flood-proofing buildings and providing support for 
property owners. Here the plan mentions the possibility of relocating out of areas at high risk 
2018] ADAPTING LAND USE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 613 
Although the prospect was broached that New Orleans would adopt a 
policy of reduced development to avoid subjecting residents and businesses 
to repeat exposure to flooding,37 the discourse of “return,” opportunism 
driven by privatization and gentrification goals,38 and the availability of 
federal funding to finance rebuilding secured the opposite outcome. 
B. New York City: A Rebuilding Imperative 
Superstorm Sandy, an intense tropical storm39 that struck the Caribbean 
and northeastern United States in late October 2012, accompanied by “major 
to record” storm surges in the New York metropolitan area and parts of New 
England, had a notable impact on New York City. The storm affected all 
major sectors, including health care, transportation, and communications;40 
the financial district and other institutional and residential structures in the 
southern half of Manhattan were immobilized and without electricity for 
five days.41 The storm also inflicted severe damage to residential properties, 
from high-rise buildings to beachfront bungalows throughout the city’s 
coastal areas. The storm heavily damaged the city’s waterfront structures 
and infrastructure, including boardwalks, landings, and terminals, and 
caused substantial beach erosion, with a loss of three million cubic yards of 
sand across the city.42 
The city’s principal policy blueprint in the aftermath of Sandy, A 
Stronger, More Resilient New York,43 proposed more than 250 broadly 
formulated initiatives to strengthen coastal resilience and building-structural 
resilience.44 The city vowed to reinforce its 520 miles of waterfront and 
adjust zoning and building code requirements to ensure that new buildings 
and substantial improvements would meet Federal Emergency Management 
 
for flooding. COASTAL PROTECTION & RESTORATION AUTHORITY OF LA., LOUISIANA’S 
COMPREHENSIVE MASTER PLAN FOR A SUSTAINABLE COAST ES-15 (2017), 
http://coastal.la.gov/wp-content/uploads /2017/04/2017-Coastal-Master-Plan_Web-Single-
Page_CFinal-with-Effective-Date-06092017.pdf. 
 37. The Times-Picayune Staff, Plan Shrinks City Footprint, NOLA, http://www.nola. 
com/politics/index.ssf/2005/12/plan_shrinks_city_footprint.html (last updated Aug. 13, 2010) 
(describing recommendation of Urban Land Institute to impose a temporary moratorium on 
building in neighborhoods especially vulnerable to flooding and returning flood-threatened 
areas to wetlands). 
 38. See Wellington, supra note 25, at 27, 32. 
 39. Sandy was considered to be post-tropical just prior to landfall. Hurricane Sandy, 
NAT’L WEATHER SERV., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://www.weather.gov 
/okx/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2018). 
 40. A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK PLANYC, supra note 15, at 14–17. 
 41. Id. at 15. 
 42. Id. at 14. 
 43. Id. at 1. 
 44. Id. at 416–434. 
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Agency (FEMA) standards.45 The city also prioritized repairing and 
elevating structurally vulnerable residential structures damaged during 
Sandy through Build It Back,46 a costly and delay-ridden program whose 
costs have allegedly far outstripped the market value of many of the 
properties undergoing rehabilitation.47 
Contemplating that coastal residential, business, and institutional uses 
would be rebuilt,48 the city explicitly rejected any suggestions “to wall the 
city in, or to retreat from the shore.”49 Instead, the report included a 
Comprehensive Coastal Protection Plan,50 proposing an array of initiatives 
to protect the rebuilt coastline: hard armoring to raise coastal edge 
elevations;51 soft shoreline armoring to reduce upland wave zones;52 and 
protecting against storm surge through integrated flood protections systems, 
floodwalls/levees, local storm surge barriers, and a multipurpose levee.53 In 
conjunction with the Rebuild By Design competition,54 which promotes 
resilient designs to mitigate the effects of sea-level rise and surges, the city 
is also helping to finance a project, dubbed “the BIG U,” comprising 10 
miles of protective berms and “deployable walls” along lower (the southern 
half) Manhattan, where low lying waterfront areas are particularly 
 
 45. Id. at 50–52, 72–73, 78–79 (elevating foundations and critical systems, and raising 
living spaces above Design Flood Elevation level). 
 46. Welcome to NYC Housing Recovery, NYC RECOVERY, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/recovery/html/home/home.shtml (last visited Aug. 9, 2018). 
 47. Bobby Cuza, In Response to NY1 Special, de Blasio Acknowledges Failures of Build 
It Back Program, NY1 (June 19, 2017, 10:30 PM), http://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-
boroughs/build-it-broke/2017/06/19/in-response-to-ny1-special-de-blasio-acknowledges-
failures-of-build-it-back-program. See also Amanda Farinacci, Complaint Alleges Build It 
Back Wasted Millions of Dollars, NY1 (June 12, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://www.ny1.com/ 
nyc/all-boroughs/news/2017/06/11/allegations-build-it-back-wasted-millions-of-dollars.html. 
 48. Thus, the report proposed retrofitting existing nursing homes and adult care facilities 
in the 100-year floodplain and existing hospitals in the 500-year floodplain. A STRONGER, 
MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK, supra note 15, at 153–54. 
 49. Id. at 7. 
 50. Id. at 50–66. 
 51. Id. at 50, 53, 58, 61 (beach nourishment, revetments, bulkheads, and tidal 
gates/drainage devices). 
 52. Id. at 53–54, 61–62 (dunes, offshore breakwaters, wetlands, living shorelines, reefs, 
and groins.) 
 53. Id. at 54–56, 63–64. 
 54. A collaborative, multi-sector venture dedicated to achieving resilience, the project 
originated as a design competition under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development to respond to the effects of Superstorm Sandy in northeastern U.S. 
coastal areas. Who We Are, REBUILD BY DESIGN, http://www.rebuildbydesign.org/about (last 
visited July 31, 2018). 
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vulnerable to surges.55 To date, many of these initiatives have been plagued 
by delays.56 
Since 2016, the city has committed to a series of up-zoning 
initiatives,—undertaken in part to increase the city’s stock of below-market-
rate housing57—in which at least half of the areas to be rezoned are in 100-
year flood zones or are likely to be remapped into those zones.58 In 2017, 
however, the City Council created Special Coastal Risk Districts in the East 
Shore section of the borough of Staten Island59 and in at-risk beachfront 
communities in the borough of Queens near Jamaica Bay.60 These measures 
will restrict density in areas acknowledged to be at particular risk for coastal 
flooding, and will be discussed in Part V.61 
Reflecting a development imperative that generally has been 
understood to benefit an urban economy and tax base,62 A Stronger, More 
Resilient New York and more recent initiatives have adopted an overall 
 
 55. Leanna Garfield, Manhattan Plans to Build a Massive $1 Billion Wall and Park to 
Guard Against the Next Inevitable Superstorm, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 27, 2018, 9:28 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/new-york-city-flooding-manhattan-coastal-barriers-2018-4. 
BIG is also the acronym for the Danish architectural firm that designed the system, Bjarke 
Ingels Group. NYC: The Big U, REBUILD BY DESIGN, http://www.rebuildbydesign.org/our-
work/all-proposals/winning-projects/big-u (last visited July 31, 2018). 
 56. Robert Lewis, Why ‘the Big U’ Storm Barrier Could End up as “Half a J,” WNYC 
NEWS (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.wnyc.org/story/five-years-later-sandy-project-grinding/. 
 57. Mandatory Inclusionary Housing, NYC PLAN., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/ 
planning/plans/mih/mandatory-inclusionary-housing.page (last updated Mar. 22, 2016) 
[hereinafter Mandatory Inclusionary Housing]. 
 58. Abigail Savitch-Lew, Retreat or Build Out? NYC’s Post-Sandy Development 
Dilemma, CITY LIMITS (Oct. 27, 2017), https://citylimits.org/2017/10/27/retreat-or-build-out-
nycs-post-sandy-development-dilemma/. 
 59. East Shore Neighborhoods, NYC PLAN., http://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/plans/ 
resilient-neighborhoods/east-shore.page (last updated Sept. 7, 2017) [hereinafter East Shore 
Neighborhoods]. 
 60. Old Howard Beach, Hamilton Beach and Broad Channel, NYC PLAN., 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/plans/resilient-neighborhoods/old-howard-beach-
hamilton-beach-broad-channel-rezoning.page (last updated June 21, 2017) [hereinafter Old 
Howard Beach]. 
 61. See infra Part V. 
 62. See, e.g., Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political 
Economy of Place, 82:2 Am. J. of Soc. 309, 309–332 (Sept. 1976). As of 2014, the value of 
property within the city’s 100-year flood zone was reported to be $129.1 billion. David W. 
Chen, As FEMA Revises the Maps to Account for Climate Change, Deciding Who Is in the 
Flood Zone Will Be a Battle with Millions of Dollars at Stake, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/07/nyregion/new-york-city-flood-maps-fema.html. 
Currently, approximately one in eight new multi-family housing units are being built along 
the city’s flood-vulnerable waterfront using resilient construction methods, and they 
command accelerating sales prices, despite the known risks of locating in a flood zone. 
Stefanos Chen, New Buildings Rise in Flood Zones, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com /2018/07/06/realestate/luxury/new-buildings-rise-in-flood-
zones.html. 
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rebuilding-as-resilience policy, with only limited consideration of retreat as 
part of the resilience calculus.63 
C. Rotterdam: Adapting to the Reality of Living with Water 
A busy port situated in a delta of the Rhine and Meuse Rivers at the 
mouth of the North Sea, Rotterdam must contend with a geographic fact, 
shared by virtually all parts of the Netherlands, that approximately 90% of 
the city lies below sea level.64 Reflected in a history of extensive flooding 
and loss,65 that fact has led the city to take a holistic approach to resilience 
policy making. Climate governance in Rotterdam encompasses a broad-
gauged adaptation approach to achieve 100% resiliency, the product of the 
multisectoral Rotterdam Climate Initiative, a collaboration among Port of 
Rotterdam, the City of Rotterdam, port and industries’ association 
Deltalinqs, and the DCMR Environmental Protection Agency to reach a 
50% decrease in carbon dioxide levels by 2025 and improve economic 
outcomes.66 This governance initiative combines coastal protection, 
planning public and private space, social education, and even the use of 
online apps to promote continuing situational awareness of the sea level.67 
As with New Orleans and New York, Rotterdam relies in part on a 
massive protective apparatus to hold back a surging sea. The 
Maeslantkering floodgate has two vast arms resting on either side of a canal 
near the mouth of the North Sea and ball joints that are sunk into the banks 
on each side of the river leading to the sea to hold the force of the water as 
the gate closes off the sea.68 Thirty pumps remove water from the two arms 
 
 63. The City did indicate that it would work with New York State to develop guidelines 
under which communities in vulnerable locations might qualify for home buyouts under a 
State-administered program, adding that it expected only a “relatively limited number” of 
areas to be eligible. A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK, supra note 15, at 81. 
 64. Dan Grossman, A Tale of Two Northern European Cities: Meeting the Challenges of 
Sea Level Rise, PULITZER CTR. (Nov. 6, 2015), https://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/hamberg-
rotterdam-flooding-climate-change-protection. 
 65. Sarah Goodyear, We’re in This Together: What the Dutch Know About Flooding 
That We Don’t, CITYLAB (Jan. 9, 2013), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2013/01/were-
together-what-dutch-know-about-water-we-dont/4355/. 
 66. BAREND VAN ENGELENBURG & PAUL NOOTHOUT, ROTTERDAM CCS CLUSTER 
PROJECT CASE STUDY ON ‘LESSONS LEARNT’, ROTTERDAM CLIMATE INITIATIVE 5–8 (Feb. 
2012), http://decarboni.se/sites/default/files/publications/37366/2012rcicasestudyfinalreport-
opt.pdf. 
 67. Michael Kimmelman, The Dutch Have Solutions to Rising Seas. The World is 
Watching., N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/15/ 
world/europe/climate-change-rotterdam.html. 
 68. The Maeslantkering Storm Surge Barrier, HOLLAND, https://www.holland.com 
/global/tourism/holland-stories/land-of-water/the-maeslantkering-storm-surge-barrier.htm 
(last visited Aug. 13, 2018), discussed in Kimmelman, supra note 67. 
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when it is necessary to reopen the gate (if, for example, the rivers leading to 
the sea overflow).69 
Perhaps the most innovative aspect of Rotterdam’s climate resilience 
policy is the program, and philosophy, named “Room for the River.”70 
Through this initiative, the city has developed public infrastructure, such as 
garages and plazas that also serve as reservoirs for the overflow of the 
bodies of water that surround and run through the city.71 Thus, the city has 
built housing around a water plaza, a dike with a rooftop park and shopping 
center, known as Dakpark,72 and reclaimed fields and canals that serve as a 
sports site, known as Eendragtspolder, while also collecting floodwater.73 
 With the recognition that the flow of water cannot completely be 
stopped, but must rather be accommodated, Rotterdam and other parts of the 
Netherlands have developed an adaptive approach that combines armoring 
at the mouth of the North Sea with a seemingly inconsistent concept that the 
city must be open to flowing water. With this accommodation, and a 
nationally promoted readiness to evacuate,74 the city’s approach to resilience 
has not closed off any part of the city for development, including 
commercial property at the waterfront.75 Rather, it seeks to capitalize on its 
vulnerable geography through its formation of a public-private network, the 
Rotterdam Centre for Resilient Delta Cities (RDC).76 Thus, resilience in 
Rotterdam is building-oriented and accommodative rather than retreat-
based. 
 
 69. Kimmelman, supra note 67. 
 70. How Water is Governed: What is Room for the River?, ALTA. WATER PORTAL 
SOC’Y., https://albertawater.com/how-is-water-governed/what-is-room-for-the-river (last 
visited Aug. 13, 2018), discussed in Kimmelman, supra note 67. 
 71. Kimmelman, supra note 67. 
 72. Dakpark Rotterdam, LET IT GROW, https://letitgrow.org/green-initiatives/dakpark-
rotterdam/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2018), discussed in Kimmelman, supra note 67. 
 73. Restructuring of the Eendragtspolder, CONNECTED: STRATEGIC CHANGE PROCESSES, 
http://www.toconnect.nl/en/a-few-examples/restructuring-of-the-eendragtspolder/ (last visited 
Aug. 13, 2018), discussed in Kimmelman, supra note 67. 
 74. NETH. U.S. WATER CRISIS RES. NETWORK, FLOOD PREPAREDNESS IN THE 
NETHERLANDS: A U.S. PERSPECTIVE (2012), https://www.preventionweb.net/files/30381 
_nuwcren2012floodpreparednessinthene.pdf (discussing evacuation planning and community 
participation in flood response); see also Kimmelman, supra note 67. 
 75. MARTIN AARTS ET AL., PORT-CITY DEVELOPMENT IN ROTTERDAM: A TRUE LOVE 
STORY, DEPARTEMENTO DE UBRANÍSTICA Y ORDENCIÓN DEL TERRITORIO (2012), http://urban-
e.aq.upm.es/pdf/PortCityDevelopment_ATrueLoveStory.pdf. 
 76. The apparent goal of the organization is to serve as a resource for delta cities 
globally, to marry safety features with improved economic opportunities, and enhance 
environmental and social quality. ROTTERDAM CTR. FOR RESILIENT DELTA CITIES, 
http://rdcrotterdam. com/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). 
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IV. MANAGING RETREAT: UNPACKING RETREAT AS A CLIMATE RESILIENCE 
APPROACH 
Compared to the coastal and building-structural approaches to 
resilience favored by the cities discussed in Part III, a policy grounded in 
whole or in part in retreat from the floodplain tends to be more disruptive of 
existing features of floodplain communities, and, for that reason, more 
challenging to implement.77 It reflects an assessment that measures entailing 
“protection in place” are not sufficient to achieve community resilience. The 
range of measures comprising retreat offers some flexibility to 
municipalities seeking to develop a climate governance policy calibrated to 
community characteristics and needs. The suite of retreat mechanisms can 
be responsive to the degree of urgency of flooding risk, economic 
considerations, the logistical feasibility of pursuing retreat options, the 
openness of floodplain communities to retreat measures, and the political 
will needed to implement retreat.78 
At one end of the spectrum, retreat can entail a complete withdrawal 
and resettlement of populations and businesses away from the flood-prone 
area. In terms of cost and disruption to the existing community, this option 
often generates resistance, and to date has been pursued only when the 
safety risks seem imminent and when community members are open to 
resettlement.79 Examples include the Catskill Mountains community of 
Sidney, New York, Isle de Jean Charles in Louisiana, and the Alaskan 
Eskimo village of Newtok. In each of these instances, the circumstances 
prompting relocation have been highly urgent. Sidney, New York’s state-
funded relocation efforts to move its flood-vulnerable business district and 
residences to higher elevations have been discussed by John Nolon in his 
analysis of climate change land-use bubbles.80 Isle de Jean Charles is the 
recipient of a federally funded “resilience grant” to cover the cost of 
resettling willing members of the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw community, 
whose coastal home has lost 90% of its original expanse as a result of the 
ravages of severe weather and incursions of coastal livelihoods.81 The 
 
 77. J. Peter Byrne & Jessica Grannis, Coastal Retreat Measures, in THE LAW OF 
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: U.S. AND INT’L. ASPECTS, 268–270 (Michael B. Gerrard 
& Katrina Fischer Kuh eds., American Bar Association 2012). 
 78. Id. 
 79. John R. Nolon, Land Use and Climate Change Bubbles: Resilience, Retreat, and 
Due Diligence, 39 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 321, 337–39 (2014). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Coral Davenport & Campbell Robinson, Resettling the First American ‘Climate 
Refugees,’ N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/03/us/resettling-
the-first-american-climate-refugees.html. The community joined the Grounded Solutions 
Network in 2016, which provides support and capacity building for members to adopt a 
community land trust model that removes land from the market and enables long-term 
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community of Newtok, is currently embarking on a long-delayed effort to 
relocate its village, which is losing land at the rate of seventy feet per year 
as a result of erosion and thawing permafrost, to a settlement nine miles 
away.82 
Where inundation and land loss are less imminent but neighborhoods 
that are low-lying or built on wetlands are susceptible to the effects of 
recurrent flooding, some residents may seek or accept government 
buyouts.83 Examples include programs offered by New York State after 
Superstorm Sandy,84 and buyouts offered to flood-prone, largely rural 
communities in Iowa and Missouri in the mid-1990s.85 These voluntary 
buyouts allow the acquired land to serve as natural buffers to coastal 
flooding, and depend in part for their success on the ability to remove 
adjacent parcels from development to achieve the hoped-for buffering 
effects.86 
A third category of retreat responses entails efforts to delay or limit 
development in occupied or currently undeveloped at-risk coastal areas, 
such as by imposing land-use restrictions on the timing, extent, and density 
of building,87 exactions accompanying the grant of permission to develop 
that limit or mitigate the impact of development,88 or “rolling” easements or 
 
housing affordability. Adam Abraham, Isle de Jean Charles Band of Biloxi-Chitimacha 
Choctaw Indians, GROUNDED SOLUTIONS NETWORK 
https://groundedsolutions.org/member_spotlight /isle-de-jean-charles-band-biloxi-
chitimacha-choctaw-indians/ (last updated 2006). Decades in the making, the resettlement 
process reflects painstaking efforts to adapt to environmental risk and preserve the 
community’s tribal traditions and culture. Tribal Resettlement, ISLE DE JEAN CHARLES, LA., 
http://www.isledejeancharles.com/our-resettlement/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). 
 82. Blake Essig, Newtok Relocation Making Progress, KTUU (Aug. 11, 2017, 12:36 
PM), http://www.ktuu.com/content/news/Newtok-relocation-effort-making-progress-43979 
7923.html; Robin Bronen, Climate-Induced Community Relocations: Creating an Adaptive 
Governance Framework Based in Human Rights Doctrine, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 357, 388-392 (2011) (discussing challenges encountered in Newtok’s efforts to 
relocate). 
 83. See infra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
 84. The Buyout program converts purchased properties to wetlands, open space, or 
storm water management systems, allowing the land to serve as nature-based buffers to 
flooding; the Acquisition Program contemplates resilient re-development of the properties. 
Notice of Change of Use of Acquisition Properties by New York Rising, N.Y. ST. 
GOVERNOR’S OFF. OF STORM RECOVERY, https://stormrecovery.ny.gov/housing/buyout-
acquisition-programs (last visited Aug. 17, 2018). 
 85. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 77, at 284–85. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 272–74. 
 88. Id. at 273–74. To avoid takings liability, mitigating exactions must demonstrate an 
“essential nexus” with the underlying land use under application and the “rough 
proportionality” of the exaction to the extent of the burden imposed by the development. 
SIDERS, supra note 20, at 14–15 (citing Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 
(1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994)). 
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development restrictions that link limits on development to the landward 
movement of the high tide line as a result of sea-level rise.89 
Local governments have a range of powers and legal mechanisms at 
their disposals with which to pursue a climate policy of managed retreat, 
starting with a municipality’s own land-use and eminent domain authority, 
in addition to other legal remedies entailed in its police powers to safeguard 
public health and safety.90 A local government can pursue a negotiated 
buyout of privately held land,91 or, if needed, exercise its eminent domain 
power by demonstrating that removing property from developable use 
serves a public safety and health purpose. Localities can arrange a transfer 
of development rights further inland,92 or acquire a conservation easement,93 
or a rolling easement that permits upland development but limits later use of 
the property as sea-level rise affects the shoreline.94 
Local governments can also use public nuisance doctrine to challenge 
or curtail risk-creating uses.95 In the context of sea-level rise, they can 
ground regulation restricting uses of property on the need to prevent 
interference with land covered by the public trust doctrine, typically land 
beneath navigable waters and tidelands.96 Additionally, local governments 
can impose building restrictions to bar redevelopment in flood-prone areas, 
or place coastal property in a land trust to insulate it from development.97 To 
 
 89. SIDERS, supra note 20, at 54–57; J. Peter Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed: Sea-level 
Rise, Property Rights, and Time, 73 LA. L. REV. 69, 109–12 (2012) [hereinafter The 
Cathedral Engulfed]. 
 90. Robin Kundis Craig, Of Sea Level Rise and Superstorms: The Public Health Police 
Power as a Means of Defending Against “Takings” Challenges to Coastal Regulation, 22 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 84, 114 (2014) (arguing that in the context of takings challenges, courts 
are likely to be more receptive to measures addressing threat of coastal inundation that are 
framed as exercise of the public health police power rather than land-use regulation takings 
challenges). 
 91. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 77, at 283–85. 
 92. SIDERS, supra note 20, at 107–08; Byrne & Grannis, supra note 77, at 287–89. 
 93. SIDERS, supra note 20, at 104–08. 
 94. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 77, at 285–86; SIDERS, supra note 20, at 54–61. 
 95. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 77, at 276. 
 96. The Cathedral Engulfed, supra note 89, at 99–100. The public trust follows the 
landward progression of the tide line such that privately-owned land will be subordinate to 
the public trust. Under these circumstances, regulation of public trust lands will not result in a 
“taking” requiring compensation. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 77, at 276. 
 97. See, e.g., SIDERS, supra note 20, at 85-102 (discussing rebuilding restrictions); 
Climate Change: Land and Climate Program, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE https://www.landtrust 
alliance.org/topics/climate-change (last visited Oct. 28, 2018) (outlining developing strategies 
for using land trusts to conserve land from development that would otherwise exacerbate 
harmful effects associated with climate change), cited in Jessica Owley et al., Climate 
Change Challenges for Land Conservation: Rethinking Conservation Easements, Strategies, 
and Tools, 95 DEN. U. L. REV. 727, 732 n.18 (2018). 
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the extent that any of these mechanisms entails physical entry upon or 
limiting the economic value of privately owned land that is not itself 
creating a nuisance or violating public safety or health standards, local 
governments presumably would be required to compensate property owners 
under the regulatory takings doctrine.98 
A. A Calculus of Vulnerability: Who Lives in the Floodplain? 
 Congress created the National Flood Insurance Program in 1968; 
participating jurisdictions adopt a floodplain management ordinance setting 
design and construction standards.99 FEMA flood insurance rate maps divide 
the U.S. into 100-year-flood (1% probability of flooding in any given year) 
and 500-year-flood zones (.02% annual probability).100 Given the 
projections of increased sea-level rise and climate change-related severe 
weather, the extent of residential occupancy in floodplains is a revealing 
indicator of climate vulnerability. 
A study of the housing stock in the 100-year floodplain and the 
combined 100-year and 500-year floodplains in the U.S. in 2011–2015 
indicates that more than 30 million people lived in the combined 
floodplain.101 The study also pinpoints the coastal areas that are heavily 
occupied. During this period, Florida had the highest number of occupied 
housing units in the 100-year and combined 100-year and 500-year 
floodplains.102 Texas, California, New York, and Louisiana round out the 
top five states for occupied housing in the 100-year and combined 
floodplains.103 “Two-thirds of the population living in the nation’s combined 
floodplains lived either in California, Florida, Arizona, Texas, or New York 
in 2011-2015.”104 
The housing units located in the floodplains bear a number of earmarks 
of vulnerability relating both to the attributes of the housing and its 
occupants. Out of all housing units in the 100-year and combined 100-year 
and 500-year floodplains, 22% were built before 1960 and thus are less 
 
 98. See, e.g., Byrne & Grannis, supra note 77, at 274–78; SIDERS, supra note 20, at 13–
20; Craig, supra note 90, at 89–99. 
 99. STEPHANIE ROSOFF & JESSICA YAGER, HOUSING IN THE U.S. FLOODPLAINS, NYU 
FURMAN CTR. 4 (May 2017), http://furmancenter.org/files/NYUFurmanCenter_HousingIn 
TheFloodplain_May2017.pdf. 
 100. Id. at 2. 
 101. CAROLINE PERI, STEPHANIE ROSOFF & JESSICA YAGER, POPULATION IN THE U.S. 
FLOODPLAINS, NYU FURMAN CTR. 2 (DEC. 2017), http://furmancenter.org/files/Floodplain 
_PopulationBrief_12DEC2017.pdf. 
 102. ROSOFF & YAGER, supra note 99, at 6. 
 103. Id. at 6–7. 
 104. PERI ET AL., supra note 101, at 2. 
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likely to be built to FEMA standards.105 The study also indicated the extent 
to which coastal areas housed lower-income individuals living in public 
housing (5% of all public housing units are located in the 100-year 
floodplain and 9% in the combined floodplains),106 and in privately-owned 
subsidized housing units (4% are located in the 100-year floodplain and 8% 
are in the combined floodplain area).107 As a further indicator of the 
economic wherewithal of floodplain residents, the data showed, among the 
census tracts located in the 100-year floodplain, that a higher proportion of 
the population lived in moderate-poverty U.S. Census Bureau tracts108 
compared to non-floodplain areas, and in the combined floodplain area, a 
higher proportion of the population lived in high-poverty109 Census Bureau 
tracts than in non-floodplain tracts.110 In terms of ethnicity, which often 
serves as a proxy for vulnerability, the study highlighted that a higher 
proportion of the population living in the combined floodplains identified as 
Hispanic/Latino (25%) compared to the proportion of Latinos in the U.S. 
population (17%);111 a lower proportion of the population living in the 
combined floodplain identified as white (55%) compared to the proportion 
of persons so identifying in the U.S. population as a whole (62%).112 
That 10% of the U.S population is exposed to the risk of living in the 
combined floodplain is a significant geographic index of vulnerability. 
Given the projections for continued sea-level rise, the additional indicators 
of vulnerability noted here, relating to populations and housing associated 
with poverty, and older housing that is less likely to meet federal flood-
 
 105. ROSOFF & YAGER, supra note 99, at 4–5. 
 106. Id. at 5. 
 107. Id. 
 108. The U.S. Census Bureau defines moderate-poverty tracts as comprising tracts where 
between 10–30% of the residents live in poverty. PERI ET AL., supra note 101, at 4. 
 109. The U.S. Census Bureau defines high-poverty tracts as those tracts in which the 
proportion of the population in poverty exceeds 30%. Id. The Census Bureau designates 
households as in poverty according to the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB’s) 
Directive 14, using a set of money income thresholds that vary by family size and make-up. 
“If the total income for a family or unrelated individual falls below the relevant poverty 
threshold, then the family (and every individual in it) or unrelated individual is designated to 
be in poverty.” The Census Bureau also uses a Supplemental Poverty Measure, which 
extends the official poverty measure by considering government benefits and expenses such 
as taxes that are not included in the official measure. Glossary, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/glossary/#term_Poverty (last visited Aug. 1, 2018). 
 110. PERI ET AL., supra note 101, at 4–5. 
 111. Id. at 3. 
 112. Id. The numbers were revealing for Arkansas, where, during the study period, 27% 
of residents in the combined floodplain were identified as “Black, Non-Hispanic,” whereas 
15% of the statewide population fell into that category. Id. at 9. With respect to poverty, 
Arkansas was among a number of states in which the poverty rate in the combined floodplain 
was at least three percentage points higher than the statewide poverty rate during the study 
period. Id. at 4. 
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proofing requirements, underscore the relevance of including these data in 
the calculus for considering retreat options among other climate governance 
approaches. 
B. A Calculus of Costs: Economic Implications of Retreat 
If the risks of continued coastal settlement are significant, the public 
costs of undertaking coastal retreat to augment a community’s resilience to 
risk can at first blush seem staggering. Where relocation of an existing 
community is under consideration, these costs include acquiring property, 
relocation costs, and the prospect of lost tax revenues if the relocating 
residents and businesses do not settle in the same taxing jurisdiction.113 The 
risk that discontinuing coastal development would depress surrounding 
property values could further reduce tax revenues.114 Infrastructure 
adjustments needed as a result of resettlement must be added in the calculus 
as well.115 
However, a policy of retreat that limits development in favor of nature-
based reuses of land also averts costs. Choosing not to develop or redevelop 
coastal land can be restorative of coastal ecosystems, which, if allowed to 
thrive, provide a range of benefits, including flood protection in upland 
areas and preventing or slowing coastal erosion by absorbing wave energy 
resulting from ocean movements.116 A recent study examining data from 
sixty-nine field measurements of coastal habitats for impact on reducing 
wave height furnished evidence of the wave-reduction effects of coastal 
habitats.117 These protective wave-reduction effects were also found to 
reduce the economic losses otherwise caused by flooding.118 A number of 
 
 113. ROBERT FREUDENBERG, ELLIS CALVIN, LAURA TOLKOFF & DARE BRAWLEY, BUY-IN 
FOR BUYOUTS: THE CASE FOR MANAGED RETREAT FROM FLOOD ZONES, LINCOLN INST. OF 
LAND POL’Y 38–39 (2016), https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/buy-in-for-
buyouts-full.pdf. 
 114. Id. at 16. 
 115. See, e.g., DEPT’ OF CITY PLAN., VISION 2020: NEW YORK CITY COMPREHENSIVE 
WATERFRONT PLAN 106–13 (2011), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf 
/plans-studies/vision-2020-cwp/vision2020/chapter3_goal8.pdf [hereinafter NEW YORK CITY 
COMPREHENSIVE WATERFRONT PLAN] 
 116. Coastal Wetlands, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/wetlands 
/coastal-wetlands (last updated June 13, 2018). 
 117. Siddharth Narayan et al., The Effectiveness, Costs and Coastal Protection Benefits of 
Natural and Nature-Based Defences, PLOS ONE (May 2, 2016), https://doi.org/10.1371 
/journal.pone.0154735. Among other findings, the study concluded that “coastal habitats–
particularly coral reefs and salt-marshes–have significant potential for reducing wave heights 
and providing protection at the shoreline.” Id. at 9. 
 118. See, e.g., Robert Costanza et al., The Value of Coastal Wetlands for Hurricane 
Protection, 37 AMBIO 241 (June 2008), http://www.robertcostanza.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2017/02/2008_J_Costanza_HurricaneProtection.pdf. 
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studies suggest that the natural protections afforded by coastal wetlands can 
be more cost-effective than built protective structures. To this point, 
wetlands have been likened to ‘‘horizontal levees.”119 
Recognizing that the incidence of wetlands is one of a number of 
factors that can affect the risk of flooding, one recent study of marsh 
wetlands in the northeastern United States estimated that wetlands reduced 
flood damage across twelve states from Hurricane Sandy, which struck in 
late October 2012, by slightly more than 1%, and avoided $625 million in 
direct flood damages from the hurricane.120 Another branch of the study, 
focused on a single county in New Jersey, predicted a 16% average 
reduction in yearly flood losses.121 The study noted that states having more 
extensive wetland cover were “strongly correlated with avoided damages”; 
among the four Sandy states in the study with the most extensive wetlands 
cover, wetlands were estimated to reduce flood damages by 20% to 30%.122 
This evidence of the cost benefits of ecosystem services suggests a 
greater role for nature-based coastal defenses vis-à-vis hard armoring as 
well as greater consideration of the value of buying out high-risk coastal 
areas and pursuing nature-based reuses in place of redevelopment. Another 
economic benefit of buyouts linked to nature-based defenses of flood-prone 
land is that they avoid the use of payouts of subsidized wind and flood 
insurance to rebuild repetitively damaged coastal properties. As public-
health and environmental law scholar Ed Richards has argued, given the 
evidence that both state-regulated private insurance practices and public 
programs such as the National Flood Insurance Program set property 
insurance in vulnerable areas below its actual cost, insurance rates do not 
accurately communicate risk or provide incentives to adapt to the increasing 
risks of sea-level rise.123 Disaster relief programs further enable, if not 
 
 119. Id. at 241. See also Narayan et al., supra note 117 (concluding that “restoration 
projects for which data are available—i.e., mangrove and marsh projects—can be cost-
effective relative to submerged breakwaters in attenuating low waves and become more cost-
effective at higher water depths”). 
 120. Siddharth Narayan et al., The Value of Coastal Wetlands for Flood Damage 
Reduction in the Northeastern USA, 7 Sci. Rep. 1, 2 (Aug. 31, 2017). 
 121. Id. at 5. The study concluded that sites with salt marshes had “significantly lower 
annual flood losses” than locations without marshes. Id. at 4–5. 
 122. Id. at 2. 
 123. Edward P. Richards, Applying Life Insurance Principles to Coastal Property 
Insurance to Incentivize Adaptation to Climate Change, 43 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 427, 
450–51, 459 (2016), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol43/iss2/8 (proposing a life 
insurance model for insuring properties facing an increasing risk of loss to sea-level rise, 
arguing that true risk-based insurance with a rising premium would more accurately 
communicate the climate change risk for the property, reduce the value of the property as a 
result of the increasing cost of the insurance, and ultimately encourage retreat-based 
adaptation). 
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encourage, property owners to rebuild in high-risk areas.124 These costly 
practices must be accounted for in any cost-benefit calculus considering the 
economic feasibility of retreat. 
C. Complicating the Calculus: Beyond Economics 
Beyond the economic implications of embracing retreat policies, the 
confluence of logistical considerations, geography, and the psychology of 
place also influences the extent to which climate governance will take 
retreat options into account. Where retreat would require withdrawal and 
relocation of current settlements, whether relocation within reasonable 
proximity of the coastal settlement is feasible depends in part on the 
geography and topography of the surrounding area. The impact of relocation 
on existing public infrastructure and patterns of residential and business 
settlement, particularly in densely populated areas,125 must be considered. 
Further, residents’ attachment to place,126 and the documented psychological 
effects of mandated relocations,127 may fuel strong community reactions 
against managed retreat as a policy. The fragmentation of existing 
community affiliations can be destabilizing, and the effects of relocation can 
be particularly disruptive of the cultural traditions and cohesiveness of long-
established settlements, such as the indigenous communities relocating from 
Isle de Jean Charles in Louisiana128 and Newtok, Alaska.129 
The nature and extent of building typology and the housing availability 
in coastal areas also complicate the feasibility of community-based retreat. 
For example, the prevalence of one-story frame bungalows along the coastal 
landscape, conspicuous in parts of New York City, is tied to the 
affordability of this housing form.130 Where housing markets are 
competitive, favoring sellers, the absence of comparably affordable housing 
farther inland can become a barrier to relocation.131 Where, also in New 
 
 124. Id. at 448–49. 
 125. NEW YORK CITY COMPREHENSIVE WATERFRONT PLAN, supra note 115, at 106. 
 126. SHERI BROKOPP BINDER, RESILIENCE AND POSTDISASTER RELOCATION: A STUDY OF 
NEW YORK’S HOME BUYOUT PLAN IN THE WAKE OF HURRICANE SANDY (Aug. 2013), https:// 
hazards.colorado.edu/uploads/quick_report/binder_2013.pdf. 
 127. MINDY THOMPSON FULLILOVE, ROOT SHOCK: HOW TEARING UP CITY 
NEIGHBORHOODS HURTS AMERICA AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 9–20, 52–70, 165–96 
(2005) (2004). 
 128. See Davenport & Robinson, supra note 81. 
 129. See Essig, supra note 82. 
 130. See generally A.F. Brady, Building Back the Bungalow, URBAN OMNIBUS (July 13, 
2016), http://urbanomnibus.net/2016/07/build-back-bungalow. 
 131. Id.; Elizabeth Rush, Leaving the Sea: Staten Islanders Experiment with Managed 
Retreat, URBAN OMNIBUS (Feb. 11, 2015), http://urbanomnibus.net/2015/02/leaving-the-sea-
staten-islanders-experiment-with-managed-retreat/. 
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York City, high-rise public housing developments seem to stand sentinel 
along highly vulnerable coastal areas,132 a policy of resettlement would need 
to address the costs and logistical challenges of relocating thousands of low-
income residents of multi-family housing, often with special needs, where 
comparable affordable housing is at a premium.133 
Undoubtedly, retreat-as-relocation can present particularly daunting 
challenges to discrete communities, encompassing environmental harm, 
potential loss of community cohesiveness and cultural identity, as well as 
economic factors tied to loss of coastal livelihood or access to more 
affordable housing. When the complicating factor of scale manifests in 
large-city scenarios, the barriers can seem insurmountable. Despite these 
challenges, the projections for continued sea-level rise and the associated 
risk of damage from storm surges make even retreat-as-relocation an 
increasingly salient consideration for coastal cities. Moreover, a more 
tailored application of retreat-as-relocation may be feasible, even in the 
context of large urban areas, that achieves public health and safety goals and 
ecological benefits, while also reaching a sounder macro-economic 
outcome, closing the spigot of public expenditure for repetitive loss 
properties. The discussion in Part V turns to recent indications that New 
York City may be open to pursuing a tailored approach to retreat within a 
larger framework of continued development.134 
V. RETREAT REVISITED: NEW YORK’S LIMITED RESORT TO RETREAT 
It is estimated that New York City has a larger number of people 
inhabiting flood-vulnerable areas than any other U.S. city.135 Following 
Superstorm Sandy’s devastating impact, New York City has emphasized 
repairing, rebuilding, retrofitting, and elevating coastal structures as part of 
 
 132. Hurricane Sandy After Action, CITY OF N.Y. (May 2013), http://www.nyc.gov/html 
/recovery/downloads/pdf/sandy_aar_5.2.13.pdf (referring throughout to the impact on public 
housing residents and structures). 
 133. Any such policy of retreat from the coastline would reverse the policy of an earlier 
era, when New York City’s low-income families displaced as a result of “slum 
clearance”were assigned to the city’s periphery, far from transportation arteries and 
employment opportunities, out of considerations of cost, to make way for urban renewal 
developments closer to the city’s Manhattan core. Jonathan Mahler, How the Coastline 
Became a Place to Put the Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/nyregion /how-new-york-citys-coastline-became-home-
to-the-poor.html. See also NICHOLAS DAGEN BLOOM, PUBLIC HOUSING THAT WORKED: NEW 
YORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 59, 62, 7072, 13031, 141 (2008). 
 134. See infra Part V. 
 135. Rush, supra note 131. That number might increase when FEMA completes its 
negotiated revision of New York City’s flood zone maps in light of recognized climate 
change risks such as sea-level rise. Id. 
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an overall rebuilding approach to resilience governance.136 Although 
NewYork has not embraced retreat as a land-use strategy, the city has 
launched a Resilient Neighborhoods137 Initiative that in selected areas 
incorporates limited aspects of retreat in combination with other resilience 
approaches. This willingness to link the idea of resilience with modest 
retreat measures along parts of the coastline considered to be particularly at 
risk reflects some effort by the city, if belated, to calibrate its resilience 
policy-setting with closer consideration of local geography and 
neighborhood contexts along the city’s 520 miles of waterfront. The 
following discussion addresses these recent developments and their 
implications for climate governance for large, heavily developed and 
populated urban areas.138 
A. Aligning State-Government Buyouts with Local Zoning Measures 
In Sandy’s aftermath, a discrete number of New York City residents in 
three high-risk neighborhoods along the eastern shore of Staten Island 
availed themselves of the New York Rising Buyout Program.139 The 
program is a fairly circumscribed aspect of what is essentially a rebuilding 
and recovery initiative administered by the New York State Governor’s 
Office of Storm Recovery and funded by a federal Community 
Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery grant.140 Under the program, 
the State of New York has purchased properties mainly in the city’s borough 
of Staten Island and in the suburban Long Island region east of New York 
City at pre-storm values, with a commitment not to redevelop the purchased 
land but to allow it to serve, as in its predeveloped state, as a natural buffer 
against flooding.141 The New York Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery 
has reported that, as of October 2016, the State of New York had purchased 
 
 136. See supra notes 4363 and accompanying text. 
 137. Resilient Neighborhoods, NYC PLAN., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/plans/ 
resilient-neighborhoods.page (last updated Sept. 7, 2017) [hereinafter Resilient 
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 138. See infra Part V.A. 
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more than 600 properties statewide, at a cost of $240 million, through the 
program.142 
The three Staten Island communities that participated in these 
voluntary buyouts—Oakwood Beach, Ocean Breeze, and Graham Beach—
were located in the East Shore, a four-mile, low-elevation area heavily 
damaged by Superstorm Sandy.143 These Staten Island residents were 
proactive in forming a buyout committee, gauging the interest of other 
residents, and identifying vulnerable properties to be included in a buyout 
plan.144 Although the buyout with natural re-use of land was not a city 
initiative, the New York City Council has since amended its Zoning Code to 
limit the density of future development in the buyout areas.145 
As part of the city’s Resilient Neighborhoods initiative, the East Shore 
is one of ten neighborhoods located in the floodplain that the city has 
earmarked for a more tailored land-use approach to resilience planning.146 In 
the East Shore Special Risk District and Rezoning, the Council enacted 
provisions proposed by the city’s Department of Planning that aligned with 
the State’s determination that these East Shore communities qualified for 
buyouts.147 The zoning measure’s key provisions recognized the East 
Shore’s vulnerability to flood damage, in part because of its location and its 
“aging” housing stock, as well as the buffering value of its “hundreds of 
acres of wetlands, Bluebelts, and parks.”148 
The main restrictions on development, limiting building in the district 
to single-family detached residences, were intended to ensure consistency 
with the area’s open space and infrastructure plans and limit encroachments 
on wetlands.149 This attention to protecting wetlands and open space while 
lowering the density of future East Shore development is a significant, if 
limited, departure from the city’s A Stronger, More Resilient New York; it 
incorporates components of retreat in a program that nonetheless remains 
committed to safe and contextual development in the East Shore area.150 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Rush, supra note 131. 
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 145. East Shore Neighborhoods, supra note 59. 
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 148. Id. 
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 150. The East Shore rezoning contemplates “changes to residential zoning to help ensure 
that future development is resilient to coastal flooding, safe and accessible for residents, and 
in line with the character of the surrounding neighborhood, while promoting mixed-use 
residential and commercial development in areas where growth may be desirable.” Id. 
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B. Planning and Zoning in the Jamaica Bay Watershed 
A recently announced community planning initiative, Resilient 
Edgemere in the city’s borough of Queens, reflects a more locally specific 
approach to resilience planning in place of a blanket embrace of rebuilding 
that characterized New York City’s first responses to Sandy.151 Edgemere is 
part of the Jamaica Bay Watershed, a highly urbanized estuary and wildlife 
refuge located at the site of an international airport, exposed to high levels 
of greenhouse gas emissions, and vulnerable by its location to Atlantic 
storms and coastal flooding.152 In developing Edgemere’s resilience 
initiative, which followed seventeen months of community engagement, the 
city committed to a suite of land-use investments: increasing flood 
protection; constructing resilient housing farther inland, away from low 
lying coastal neighborhoods, including some proposed resettlement of 
residents to these areas; maintaining open space; and creating street and 
infrastructure improvements.153 
The city’s relatively modest, neighborhood-based relocations away 
from the coastal area entail moving “eligible and willing” residents onto 
city-owned land and limiting housing development in a to-be-created 
Hazard Mitigation Zone by placing deed restrictions on lots that the city 
would acquire.154 The Plan prompted concern and resistance from some 
community members,155 which suggests the strong attachment to place that 
complicates use of managed retreat with resettlement, even when access to 
retreat is offered on a voluntary basis. Perhaps anticipating these responses, 
the city seems scrupulously to have avoided the rhetoric of retreat in the 
Edgemere proposal; instead, it uses “de-densifying” to capture the idea of 
resettling residents further inland to avoid flooding.156 
The lead agency for the Edgemere Community Plan is the city’s 
Department of Housing Preservation and Development, highlighting the 
extent to which a central plan to provide, but control, housing options has 
shaped this community-based initiative. In tandem with this broader-based 
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https://ny.curbed.com/2017/4/13/15280808/climate-change-queens-edgemere-photo-essay. 
 156. Id. 
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community planning in Edgemere, the city has exercised its zoning authority 
in nearby Jamaica Bay communities, adopting a Special Coastal Risk 
District and Rezoning for Hamilton Beach and Broad Channel.157 Noting the 
area’s “exceptional flood risk,” the rezonings limit development to detached 
houses and one-family (Broad Channel) or two-family (Hamilton Beach) 
residences.158 
The zoning amendment creating the Special Coastal Risk District ties 
the enactment to the City’s public health, safety, and welfare powers; at the 
same time, it includes the goal of maintaining the city’s tax base by 
“promot[ing] the most desirable use of land and . . . the value of land and 
buildings.”159 Thus, the city has developed a flexible mechanism to 
decelerate development in at-risk coastal areas without effecting a complete 
withdrawal from these regulated areas; the city has integrated land-use 
controls within a framework that contemplates continued productive uses of 
the rezoned areas, when feasible. 
These resilience planning and zoning regulations are modest and do not 
alter the city’s overall orientation in climate governance to rebuilding. This 
is especially evident in the city’s commitment to up-zone neighborhoods, 
including neighborhoods located in the city’s floodplain, as a key strategy 
for spurring both market-based development and creation of below-market-
rate housing units.160 However, the more targeted responses to areas that 
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present a heightened risk of flooding stand in contrast to the city’s earlier 
blanket rejection of retreat in A Stronger, More Resilient New York. These 
recent responses suggest that the city is shifting—if slowly and only 
slightly—to a more nuanced spatial assessment of vulnerability. 
VI. CONCLUSION: AN INVENTORY FOR CONSIDERING RETREAT 
Coastal cities must navigate, literally and metaphorically, the uncharted 
waters produced by sea-level rise and storm surges. Developing effective 
governance responses benefits from understanding coastal areas as “socio-
ecological systems,”161 or multilayered systems that form “literal edges of 
ecological and cultural zones.”162 Crafting climate governance entails 
processes that take appropriate account of the interplay between the physical 
and social dimensions of coastal communities, and that recognize, in turn, 
the importance of community-based learning and social integration.163 
Informed by a socio-ecological systems approach, a coastal community’s 
vulnerability to climate risk builds from a complex, multi-faceted set of 
conditions, including “characteristics of exposure, susceptibility, and coping 
capacity, shaped by dynamic historical processes, differential entitlements, 
political economy, and power relations, rather than as a direct outcome of a 
perturbation or stress.”164 A sound approach to resilience governance is thus 
a broad-gauged inquiry, one that is equally attentive to equity and 
environmental concerns. 
Using a socio-ecological systems lens, an inquiry into whether and how 
retreat can be integrated into a locality’s climate governance scheme calls 
for a careful assessment of a range of factors: ecological, public health, and 
safety considerations; implications of retreat for infrastructure and the built 
environment; the source and extent of federal, state, and local legal authority 
to pursue retreat; political capacity/will to engage retreat; the extent of 
expenditure of public money for retreat (acquisition and relocation costs, 
foregone tax revenues) vis-à-vis rebuilding (cost of reconstruction that 
meets enhanced code and insurance requirements, regulatory oversight); 
identifying sources of public and private money available to underwrite 
resettlement; effective stewardship of the social infrastructure (drawing here 
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on sociologist Eric Klinenberg’s use of the term);165 relatedly, community 
education and engagement concerning the variables that make the need for 
relocation more urgent; sociological and psychological dimensions of 
policies that encourage or require retreat; and short-term versus long-term 
approaches to retreat.166 
Although none of these factors, on their own, would likely be sufficient 
to support a determination to initiate retreat measures, these interrelated 
considerations engage a broad, landscape-mapping perspective that includes 
sociological and psychological aspects of community resilience crucial to 
climate governance. As localities confront the increasing urgency of rising 
sea levels and the consequences of coastal flooding, they must develop a 
contextualized understanding of the range of strategies encapsulated in 
managed retreat. Coastal communities must commit to a governance process 
that more centrally incorporates, rather than subordinates, consideration of 
retreat mechanisms in climate resilience planning, such that managing 
retreat becomes as integral to climate governance as resilient rebuilding and 
hard armoring the coastline. 
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